This COP, more so than others, had many questioning whether COPs were still fit for purpose. There was a sense of futility when petrostate COP host, Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev, called fossil fuels a “gift of God.” While recent COPs have been held in authoritarian petro-states like the UAE and Egypt, the pro-fossil fuel stance this year was palpable. Many senior leaders did not attend, and for the first time ever the negotiation bloc for island states walked out of the final talks. Not since COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009, have we come so close to negotiations falling apart. The event was overshadowed by Argentina withdrawing its negotiators three days before, on the instruction of its far-right leader and climate science denier Javier Milei. The United States election of Donald Trump, who has pledged to exit the Paris Agreement again, also fuelled concerns that the Paris Agreement would be “crippled ”. Some speculated that his incoming presidency is what prompted developing countries to agree to the watered down finance target, choosing to rather deal with the “devil they knew” than the one to come.
At this COP we got a disastrous climate finance outcome. Nothing even close to what African countries and the rest of the developing world was asking for in terms of volume, specificity, predictability, burden sharing, and accountability. Little was also achieved when it came to mitigation with some regression on language around transitioning away from fossil fuels. Adaptation however achieved some wins with countries agreeing to include means of implementation (including finance) within the indicators for measuring the global goal on adaptation. This will be a backdoor to re-introducing finance into the goal. Another win was that countries agreed to include discussions on trade within the work plan of the Forum on Response Measures. Up until now it has been impossible to get countries to agree to talk about trade and the CBAM at the COP. Carbon market participants and African countries are also delighted to finally see a set of rules for Article 6, to kickstart the Paris led carbon market. Loss and damage however disappointed with pledges to the new fund’s coffers still a long way away from what is needed.
In our analysis of the COP we break down some of the key issues and what was agreed to, highlighting African country priorities and positions.
Finance
The primary task for negotiators at this year’s COP was finding a new climate finance target to replace the historic US$100 billion pledge by developed to developing countries. Parties have had more than two years of lead up to the negotiations on the issue, but developed countries only came up with a proposed number late into the negotiations. According to COP President, Mukhtar Babayev, “we put [$250bn] forward because the global north had been simply immovable in our efforts to either increase this figure or announce it earlier.” This amount was firmly rejected by developing countries. Two days before the end of the COP, the negotiation group of developing countries known as the G77 plus China were pushing for US$500 billion. They also demanded a clear reference to the obligation of developed countries to provide finance in terms of Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement, as a push back at attempts to expand the donor base and emphasise the legal responsibility of developed countries. At this point the group of Least Developed Countries walked out together with a bloc representing small island states (AOSIS). This marked the first time the island group has walked out of negotiations in the 29 years of climate talks, because other countries were “laughing at them” for asking for larger sums. The initial amount then climbed fractionally to US$300 billion and was gavelled through two days after the close of COP by Babayev, notwithstanding the objections of India, Bolivia and Nigeria, with Nigeria calling the amount “a joke ”.
The final text that was agreed stipulates that the $300 billion is to be provided by developed countries “taking the lead .” This language is perceived as a veiled attempt to expand the donor base. It also calls on all actors to work together to mobilise US$1.3 trillion of public and private finance by 2035.
Going into the negotiations African countries had been asking for US$1.3 trillion of mobilised and provided climate finance. However, they wanted something that went beyond simply what developed countries elected to pledge, and in a form that did not exacerbate already high levels of debt. Instead they wanted the majority of it to be provided as grant and highly concessional finance. It was also critical that the figure agreed to was needs based, and informed by what it would cost developing countries to implement their domestic climate plans known as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and Adaptation Plans.
But unfortunately, African countries got the opposite. The US$300 billion is an amount developed countries felt was realistic in the current economic times (notwithstanding the US defence budget is US$800 billion alone), and is a figure they proposed. This is despite the acknowledgement in the text that the cost of implementing NDCs will be US$455–584 billion/year and adaptation costs will be US$215–387 billion. This does not take account of loss and damage finance either.
Moreover, contrary to what has been reported, the $300 billion is not a “core” of grant and concessional finance within a wider $1.3 trillion target. Instead, it is to be made up of a wide variety of sources, including public, private, bilateral and multilateral finance. It expressly includes all finance from multilateral development banks that has been mobilised, which lands developing countries in exactly the same position they have been to date. Without an agreement on the minimum amount to be paid by developed countries, only a small fraction will likely be provided in grant or highly concessional terms in an unpredictable and uncertain way, and private “mobilised” climate finance, which comes at a cost, will fill the gap. In other words, the finance goal could very well just exacerbate the existing debt and climate trap developing countries are in.
This begs the question: what is the point of the larger US$1.3 trillion target if its terms are not materially different? Both goals are all about securing finance from a wide array of sources. In the words of Brandon Wu from Action Aid USA in relation to the initial US$250 billion proposal: “it’s all about mobilising and not about actually providing. We know from our experience of the US$ 100 billion [goal set in 2009] that mobilising is close to meaningless”.
There were also no agreed sub-targets for adaptation, mitigation and loss and damage finance. There is no burden sharing agreement between countries on how finance would be provided transparently and predictably. All the work that took place over the past year discussing potential sub-themes and definitions of climate finance has come to naught. Instead, the target is devoid of any granularity and is to apply for 10 years with an opportunity to “review” it in 2030 (the text makes no mention of a revision before 2035). However, the African Group of Negotiators’ Chair, Ali Mohamed considers a revision in 2030 a must. At the closing plenary he stated: “Let it be clear that the agreed figure of $300 billion per annum is an inadequate amount, which has to be reviewed in 2030 and revised upward in line with needs of developing countries.”
The G77 and China were also pushing back on the need to couch the provision of finance by developed countries in line with the language of the Paris Agreement, specifically Article 9.1. which states that developed countries “shall” provide finance to developing countries to assist them with mitigation and adaptation. The AGN believes that the Paris Agreement was watered down by placing an obligation to contribute to the goal on all parties with developed countries “taking the lead”. In their view, this “kills the spirit of the climate convention”.
In a post-COP statement, the group lamented that “Africa stands here with a sense of realism and resignation. Delivery of the aims of the Convention and its Paris Agreement remain deeply uncertain. We are realistic about the journey ahead. But let us remember that these commitments are not acts of charity. They are acts of survival, shared prosperity, and solidarity. Climate finance is not a handout – it is the moral and economic imperative of our age.”
Adaptation
Another COP29 priority was to progress the development of indicators to track the implementation of the Global Adaptation Goal, following last year’s agreement on the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience. A major outcome on this issue was not expected, and the AGN expressed that more time was needed for countries to research and deliberate on them so that they could come up with a draft mid 2025.
African countries were hoping that “means of implementation”, which includes finance, capacity building and technology transfer, would also be included within the indicators. This would ensure that finance would also get channelled to the Global Goal on Adaptation and that there would be transparency and accountability around this finance. The issue became crucial as the new finance target agreed to at Baku does not have a quantified minimum adaptation finance target. It only affirms the need to balance adaptation with mitigation finance. However, developed countries were reticent. The EU in particular was against its inclusion, as it wanted to manage expectations on finance across the multiple negotiation tracks. Surprisingly, the United Kingdom was in support of including finance. In the final text that was agreed (and possibly because the new global finance target makes no mention of an adaption finance component), countries agreed to include means of implementation within the indicators, to the joy of African countries.
During negotiations the issue of “transformational adaptation” also arose. It is a contested and evolving concept put forward by climate scientists who are concerned around the scale and depth of adaptation interventions. It proposes adaptation responses that have deep systemic shifts that address the root causes of vulnerability, and durable interventions that unlock systemic changes. It is something more than an “incremental” adaptation. While useful, developing countries feel that this yet to be fully defined concept might stand in the way of adaptation finance being granted to projects on the basis that they were not sufficiently “transformational”, coupled with a lack of understanding of what it would entail to prove that a project was “transformational”. This follows from previous challenges in accessing adaptation finance out of the bigger climate funds such as the Green Climate Fund, and that “transformational adaptation” would simply become another barrier. There were also concerns about the complexity of transformational adaptation, its resource-intensive nature, and the risks of maladaptation, as well as an over-focus on this one approach at the expense of others. The AGN felt it had not been proposed with enough time to consider the issue and, together with most developing countries, did not support its inclusion. The final text “recognises” transformational adaptation and launches the Baku Adaptation Roadmap to further the progression of the global goal on adaptation.
Carbon Markets
More than a decade in the making, COP29 also saw countries finally agreeing to a set of rules to govern carbon markets, primarily relating to Article 6.2 and 6.4 of the Paris Agreement. Article 6.2. governs the trade of carbon credits between countries, enabling buyers to use these credits to meet their mitigation targets in their NDCs. Article 6.4. is a new carbon standard under the Paris Agreement that issues carbon credits, called the Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism (PACM). It is effectively a reformed successor to the Clean Development Mechanism.
The rules that were adopted have a long history. In 2021, at COP26 in Glasgow, an independent supervisory body was established. One of its tasks was to recommend standards for carbon removals (a highly contentious topic), and methods that would guide how carbon credits are issued, reported and monitored. But their recommendations were not accepted over the following years following disagreement on whether they were sufficiently robust and scientifically grounded. The Supervisory Body then published its recommendations on carbon removals (guidelines and requirements to implement projects that remove carbon from the atmosphere, such as forestry projects) as “internal standards” earlier this year. This includes a mandatory “sustainable development tool” that provides human rights and environmental safeguards for projects, more conservative baseline assumptions (how to calculate GHG emissions assuming the project did not go ahead), and checks to ensure that projects are really “additional” and that they would not have happened anyway.
On day one of the COP, the COP President pushed for the adoption of the methodologies for removals, prompting claims that they had been rushed through. In the weeks that followed, negotiators further developed the rules, and a final decision was adopted at the plenary. With the rules more or less complete, countries can now move towards implementation. Speaking at the COP, the EU’s Article 6 negotiator Martin Hession stated that now that the rules for the PACM are complete “we think that we’ve delivered the world’s first Paris-aligned crediting standard.”
Observer groups however have continued to raise concerns with the PACM rules. There are apparent issues with the new rules on methodologies for carbon removals. For example, the final rules reportedly do not stipulate time periods or minimum standards for “durable” forestry projects. There is also a concern about a lack of transparency and accountability, and an unresolved issue of how historic credits from the CDM will be dealt with under the new regime.
Rules for Article 6.2. that allow countries to trade credits were also concluded at the COP. They “request” countries to provide more upfront information when reporting on their trading activities, following concerns that the trading platform would become a “wild west.” Some experts still, however, feel that in their current form they place too much weight on third parties to scrutinise the trade of credits between countries to ensure that poor quality credits are not being exchanged. The agreement also saw the creation of a dual system of registries at the national and international level for trades, to cater for countries that do not have their own national registry.
Mitigation
The Mitigation Work Programme was created in Glasgow in 2021 to “urgently scale up mitigation ambition and implementation in this critical decade”. Countries continued to argue whether they had a mandate to issue a high level political outcome under this programme, and how it would link to the Global Stocktake which was the outcome from last year’s COP. Debates to date have been about whether the programme should be dialogue focused only (a preference of developing countries) or whether it should achieve more substantive outcomes (a developed country preference). The issue with the Global Stocktake is whether the Mitigation Work Programme should now address mitigation actions that were set out in the Stocktake, such as “transitioning away from fossil fuels”, or whether that fell outside of its dialogue driven approach. At COP29 China and Saudi Arabia were strongly against including the Stocktake’s outcomes. Developed countries wanted dialogue to address “how to get there”, not necessarily prescribing new targets or objectives. Together with other developing nations, the African group rejected the informal text that was on the table, arguing that it was a vehicle for “prescriptive, top-down” targets. Developed countries were frustrated by a lack of reference to the Stocktake or fossil fuels and its lack of a high level message for the next round of NDCs. As a result, no agreement was reached and it has been postponed to the next climate talks in Bonn in mid 2025.
Loss and Damage
Finance remained a key focus area in this workstream as well, following the launch of the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage last year. This Fund was fully operationalised at COP29, following the signing of the Trustee Agreement and Hosting Agreement with the World Bank. Attention then quickly turned to filling its coffers. Unfortunately finance for loss and damage didn’t make it into the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance, notwithstanding African and developing countries asking for its inclusion as a sub-target. Instead, the final text for the target acknowledges that gaps remain and that it requires public and grant based finance. Sweden, Australia and New Zealand made pledges to the fund raising total commitments to US$731 million. However, US$100 billion annually is needed.
Response Measures
The day after Donald Trump’s election victory, China, on behalf of the BASIC Group (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) submitted a proposal to add “climate-change-related unilateral restrictive trade measures” to the COP agenda. This would theoretically include unilateral trade measures like the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM, a carbon border tariff on imports). This suggestion drove an eight hour dispute on the agenda on the first day of the COP. Ultimately it was dropped from the agenda, but progress on trade was made in other forums. Our work has consistently expressed a concern that trade and the CBAM have not been given a seat at the negotiation table. This follows ongoing wranglings within a UNFCCC body called the Forum and the Katowice Committee on Impacts (KCI) tasked with dialogue on domestic mitigation “response measures”, including unilateral trade measures, that historically has failed to agree to discuss trade measures.
Breakthrough was reached when countries agreed to create a four year work plan for the Forum and KCI to discuss response measures for 2026-2030. The work plan includes an item relating to “cross-border impacts” of “measures taken to combat” climate change. This would include the CBAM, and other measures such as the EU’s Deforestation Regulations. Finally, we now have a platform to talk about trade measures at the COP.
Just Transition
Last but never least, talks on the Just Transition continued but did not deliver any progress. In the climate talks in June this year, developing countries were pushing for more concrete outcomes from the Just Transition work programme so that it was not just a talk shop (which ironically is just what developed countries wanted to get out of the Mitigation Work Programme). Developed countries on the other hand felt that a workplan was premature. The same issues arose again at COP, with the EU and Environmental Integrity Group pushing for mitigation considerations, and the G77 and China pushing for finance and adaptation, and references to equity. But perhaps the bigger issue was a lack of intervention and convening power exercised by the COP President. Notwithstanding requests to convene meetings, these were organised too late and countries were just too far apart to agree to the draft text on the penultimate day. Accordingly, talks have been pushed over to the Bonn climate talks in mid 2025. Possibly negotiators could consider a trade: they could agree for the Just Transition Work Programme and Mitigation Work Programme to both be more than just “talk shops” and to enable countries to agree to concrete outcomes. If countries are being asked to move towards more actionable mitigation items, then the Just Transition talks must also have actionable items on how these are to be financed and supported.
In the end, while there were a few wins, the finance outcome was just too disappointing, too long term and too impactful for the gains on trade and adaptation to outshine. Trust levels are precariously thin, both between parties and with the COP process itself. The next COP will be held in Belém in Brazil. Its president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, has dubbed it the last chance to avoid an irreversible rupture in the climate system. It would take monumental pledges to the global climate funds over the next year to rebuild even a small level of confidence in the system, however this appears unlikely with the incoming US Presidency, ongoing wars in the Middle East and Ukraine and rising inflation. Not only is the climate system broken, but seemingly the COP one too.
