COP30 ended on Saturday last week, amidst a desperate push by some states to include some mention of fossil fuel in the text and efforts to develop a roadmap to transition away from them. There were also call for a similar roadmap to end deforestation. None came to pass, nor did a more structured and transparent commitment to clarify how countries would deliver on their climate finance commitments or support adaptation.
The Global Goal on Adaptation Indicators which many had hoped would be one of the COP’s flagship outcomes were agreed, amidst objections in the closing plenary, but were born from such a contested process and saw such material last minute changes, that there are concerns they will be unimplementable.
Campaigners will, however, celebrate the decision to create a Just Transition Mechanism to enhance international cooperation, technical assistance, capacity-building and knowledge sharing. Equally the final decision texts calls for the tripling of adaptation finance by 2035. While not exactly aligned to what developing countries had asked for, it at least is a progression on the previous commitment and gives some clarity to the direction of adaptation finance.
Like its predecessors the final outcome text, the Global Mutirão decision, is strong on new initiatives, and dialogues, but weak on accountability mechanisms. Instead there is a continuing trend to move action outside of the COPs to voluntary initiatives, roadmaps and pledges, that are referenced in but not applicable to all Parties. Whether Africa will feature and actively participate in some of these may depend on its willingness to forego promises of finance and support.
Overall Sentiment
The same sentiment that pervaded previous COPs again dominated the rooms. Developed countries and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) were pushing for higher ambition in NDCs and fossil fuel transitions, wanting more structure and clarity on how this could be achieved, including through a fossil fuel transition roadmap. Developing countries, particularly the African Group held the line that mitigation should not be singled out, and equal clarity was also needed for the provision of finance and support for adaptation. When talk was raised of the need for a roadmap on transitioning away from fossil fuels, they quipped that similar roadmaps were needed for adaptation and finance, as well as NDC development and implementation.
Petro States, particularly Saudi Arabia, as in previous years, continued to be steadfast against the inclusion of any reference to fossil fuels, pushing back against not just a roadmap but any political process for or reference to them. But it was not alone. In the final hours as the COP plenary was gavelling to a close, Colombia objected to text from the mitigation work stream, insisting that there be a “global dialogue in 2026…[on] industry and pathways for implementing transition away from fossil fuels”. Nigeria objected to this arguing that mitigation pathways should be self-determined and take different national circumstances into account. In either event Colombia’s request was not entertained because decisions had been finalised, but it highlights the level of disagreement across parties, and not just Saudia Arabia, of even having a discussion about fossil fuel transitions.
More advanced economies, such as China, remained reluctant to be drawn into the fold of climate finance liable countries, and strongly advocated for more accountability from developed countries on their finance commitments. In the final days China even pushed for a $300 billion finance delivery roadmap “to avoid blame shifting”. Developed countries sought to deflect attention from the $300 target, instead wanting to focus on leveraging international finance and the creation of an “enabling environment”.
The EU in particular strongly rejected attempts to address the finance challenge across multiple negotiation tracks, questioning why “every reference” to accelerating ambition had to include a reference to support, arguing that not all actions were conditional on finance. In return a group called the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG), led by Switzerland, had opposed any reference in the text to the financial obligations of developed countries, the tripling of adaptation finance, as well as any burden sharing agreement on finance, interpreting this as an attempt to renegotiate last year’s new climate finance goal.
On the other hand, ralks about a better enabling environment for finance transcended workstreams, and were particularly pervasive in adaptation discussions where there was a push to get developing countries to reform their own financial and policy environment to attract investment. This was not always received well, as some interpreted it as an attempt to infringe sovereign policy choices.
In general each country wanted more granularity, implementable outcomes and dedicated processes for the issues most dear to them. When tasked with addressing these head-on in the various working groups, progress was stilted and often conditional. Frustrations on finance were particularly high among developing countries, a hangover of a poorly managed COP29 last year and deep disappointment with its new finance goal.
Lastly, there was some discontent between developing countries when the African Group sought to have its special needs and circumstances addressed, an issue which the COP30 Presidency held special consultations on. Some Latin American argued that the suggestion highlighted a regional bias especially since it was the first Latin American COP “in a decade” and stated like Bangladesh lamented that it created competition among developing countries. There was ultimately no consensus, and parties were invited to participate in a special event on the topic towards the end of the negotiations.
Tensions between some developing countries have been strained, not only on this issue but also in relation to which countries gain access to the limited funds available. Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) had sought to preserve their special status and right of priority access to funds, however, Saudi Arabia, has objected to what it called unfair treatment of Oman (a relatively wealthy petro state that is classified as developing) whose application for early warning system finance to the GCF was rejected. This brought to the fore the question of how to design systems and mechanisms that are equitable and accessible to those in need.
Keeping the Science and Multilateralism Alive
Despite obvious tensions between parties throughout the talks, there was nevertheless a lighter spirit than in previous years, where talks had been hosted in Petro-States. There was also continued support for a show of multilateralism. In the leadup to the COP it was repeatedly emphasized that it should be one that confirmed the spirit of multilateralism and celebrated the ten-year anniversary of the Paris Agreement. Amid heightened geopolitical tensions, the absence of the US delegation and its withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, and in the context of the tensions set out above, it was exceptional that Parties were able to come to an agreed cover text. Indeed, the EU almost walked away in the final talks and the COP30 Presidency had been reluctant to develop a cover text at the outset. But desire to put forward a display of multilateralism, signal overall intent and commitment to the process, and to find a home for a number of issues that did not fell within the mandates of some agenda items won the day.
While seemingly innocuous, the cover text’s reaffirmation of the 1.5°C temperature goal, support for the available climate science, and reference to it being the “COP of Truth” was also an important signifier. Earlier in the negotiations, the Arab Group and India had called reference to a statement of record-breaking temperatures in 2025 in the World Meteorological Organisation’s State of the Climate Update as “simply misleading”, and argued that the discussions should uphold scientific integrity, and not indulge “alarmist rhetoric that is scientifically accurate and misleading”. Affirmation of the science and the temperature goal are both important displays of intent and are particularly prescient following the ICJ’s advisory opinion on this aspect, which also affirmed the 1.5°C degree goal.
Just Transitions and Trade
Early on in the talks there was general agreement on the need to move beyond the status quo, and developed countries, who had been anxious about duplication, warmed up and then eventually agreed to the creation of a Just Transition Mechanism. Delegates also agreed “key messages” of the transition that that acknowledge its cross-societal nature, the relevance of social protection, and centrality of adaptation, elements the African Group had long supported.
Despite talking about it for the first time, Parties could not, however, agree on how to address critical minerals. The UK, Australia and the European Union formally backed language on the need for diverse, transparent and traceable mineral supply chains, which include local consultations, respect for human rights and value addition. However in the final hours this was deleted following a push back from Russia and China. Commenting on this, Mohamed Adow, director of thinktank Power Shift Africa, noted, “wiping their realities out of the text is both ethically and politically indefensible.” The lack of regulation or funding for a truly just transition places the burden of ethical resource extraction squarely on African communities.
Parties also meaningfully engaged for the first time on trade measures within the Just Transition Working Group, with the EU protesting the framing of climate policies as trade measures and the singling out specific Parties (presumably itself).It also rejected any suggestion of reporting on trade related measures. It argued that if unilateral trade measures were discussed, they would also want to see talks on export restraints on raw materials that are essential to clean technology and energy. Many African countries such as Zimbabwe and Namibia have all imposed these type of restraints on their critical mineral exports. Ultimately, it was agreed in the cover decision that there would be three dialogues with the participation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) culminating in a high-level event in 2028. This is significant because, to date, trade discussions have often been pushed to the sidelines, on the argument that they are better addressed by the WTO.
Finance
One of the major outcomes of the COP was a “call for efforts” to at least triple levels of adaptation finance by 2035. Undeniably this is a positive outcome but still flawed. The previous text to 2025 as the base year was ultimately deleted and it is not clear where the finance will be sourced, e.g. from governments or the private sector. In the final plenary, Malawi on behalf of the LDC Group said that it came to the COP with the message of tripling adaptation finance by 2030 (not 2035) based on 2025 levels and that this finance would be grant based, and that it was disappointed that this was not achieved. It called the related paragraph 53 [of the Mutirão decision] “weak” and said “we compromised” following the long hours of work.”
Importantly, countries also finally agreed to create a dedicated space to discuss finance, through the creation of a two year work programme. Some countries had wanted it to only focus on the implementation of developing country finance obligations, however agreement could only be reached that it would discuss climate finance in general, including developed country obligations under Article 9.1. Hopefully with this platform now secured, debates and tensions on finance will have less of a spill-over into other workstreams.
There will also be a high-level ministerial round table to “reflect” on last year’s new climate finance target and its implementation. The decision came in the wake of a report from the Independent High-Level Expert Group on Climate Finance, which was tasked by the COP to put forward options for meeting climate finance commitments. It found that emerging markets and developing economies outside China will need to invest $3.2 trillion per year by 2035 to meet global climate and development goals, including $2 trillion for the clean energy transition. Of the total, $1.3 trillion would need to come from external sources, including development finance and the private sector.
Countries also remained divided on to what extent the private sector should be pulled into financing adaptation responses. The attempt by developed countries to include a reference to “innovative financial instruments” as a source of finance within the Adaptation Fund during talks drew resistance from most developing countries, including the AGN. Their concerns were validated by the recent findings of the UNEP Adaptation Gap Report released just before the COP, which found that private finance would realistically only contribute 15-20% to total national adaptation funding needs by 2035, and which questioned the general effectiveness of innovative financial instruments in an adaptation context, highlighting their marginal ability to contribute. The EU also supported text that would require these recipient countries to create a more enabling environment for investment and implementation. This hearkens to discussions in other forums, including on adaptation indicators (see below), that doing so infringes national sovereignty and policy space.
Adaptation
On adaptation, the COP delivered a set of 59 indicators to track the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA). This was a priority for South Africa which has championed the development of the GGA since 2018. Many expected them to be the featured outcome of the COP, however there were heated debates between the African Group and developed countries that the draft set were “intrusive”, eroded solidarity, infringed sovereignty and shifted the financial burden to African and other developing states. These requirements appear to have been dropped in the final text, together with numerous other changes to the indicators which were slimmed from 100 to 59. There are now, however, concerns that the last minute changes infringe their credibility, and there is a lack of clarity on the agreed policy alignment and refinement process that will take place over the next two years.
In the final plenary, the African Group said the work concluded on the indicators was an “important step” but also cautioned that “indicators alone cannot protect a family from rising waters or yield harvest during a prolonged drought. Without means of implementation, finance, technology, capacity, these indicators remain elegant words on paper.” For this reason they underscored the importance of better support for implementing National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), adding that they are “not administrative documents, they are lifelines,” adding further that “when they remain unfunded, it is not simply a gap in their agenda, it is a missing opportunity to safeguard communities who live each day on the edge of climate extreme conditions.” The LDC Group also lamented the lack of means of implementation for NAPs.
Fossil Fuels and Mitigation
Most African States did not join the call by 88 countries during the middle of the talks for a roadmap to transition from fossil fuels, with only Kenya, Sierra Leone and some small island African states supporting the notion. Following significant opposition from some petro-states, the proposal was ultimately dropped and instead the COP30 Presidency will develop a voluntary roadmap outside of the formal negotiations, together with a roadmap on ending deforestation. They will be developed alongside two other initiatives to drive ambition and foster NDC and NAP implementation, namely the Global Implementation Accelerator and the “Belém Mission 1.5”.
The group supporting the roadmap will also hold the first global conference on the issue next year, with some suggestions that this group could pursue a lower carbon bloc between themselves through trade and other measures. This suggestion has been around for some time and hearkens to discussions of a possible Climate Club a few years ago. It is as yet unclear whether this will transpire, and if so whether the non-participation or not of African countries in this endeavour will disadvantage the region or not.
Loss and Damage
A material outcome of the review of the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage was agreement to develop a global “State of Loss and Damage” report highlighting support needs. The decision also calls for the Santiago Network to expedite its delivery of technical support. There will also be support for the integration of loss and damage into national climate planning. Guidance was also given to the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage on how to, among other things, ensure it remains easy to access. Challenges remain, however, on how to ensure pledges result in actual contributions, and unfortunately there was no decision to urgently scale loss and damage financial support.
Technology
At the COP countries also discussed the Technology Implementation Programme, which was established in 2023, as well as the Climate Technology Centre and Network. In the final Plenary the G77 also said that the true breakthrough on technology items at COP30 lay in the work achieved on the Climate Technology Centre and Network, stating that “by agreeing on new functions and hosting criteria, we have made this Centre fit for [responding to] the climate change.”
Gender
Despite strenuous opposition from some Arab states and Russia, the Gender Action Plan was also agreed to at the COP. Among other things it calls on countries to integrate gender considerations into national planning, the use of gender related data for decision making, and supports collaboration between various actors.
Going Forward
The COP confirmed that Ethiopia will host COP32 in 2027, a decisive step that positions the Continent to showcase its climate agenda, and enable it to lead discussions on issues that are critical to its people. Next year’s COP will be held in Türkiye, but with Australia serving as the “President of Negotiations.” As part of a compromise between the countries in an effort to settle which would host, Türkiye signing the host-country agreement with the UNFCCC, organizing the World Leaders Summit, and serving as the COP 31 President-Designate, and will also lead the Action Agenda. However, Australia will nominate a representative to preside over the negotiations and will host a pre-COP in the Pacific.
